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DISEASE CONTROL AND BORDER 
LOCKDOWN AT THE EU’S INTERNAL 
BORDERS DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC:  
THE CASE OF FINLAND
J. Virkkunen
University of Eastern Finland 
2 Yliopistokatu St., Joensuu, FI-80101, Finland 
The article discusses the lockdown of the EU’s internal borders during the COVID-19 
pandemic in Finland. Special attention is paid to bordering as a means for disease 
control and the governments’ aim to “protect the population and secure functions of 
society” during the pandemic. Not only did the government restrict flights and ‘non-
essential’ travel from non-Schengen countries such as Russia, China and Thailand 
but, with some exceptions, it also restricted everyday cross-border encounters and 
commuting between Finland and its Schengen neighbours of Sweden, Norway and 
Estonia. The restrictions hampered tourism and migrant-dependent industries; they 
also complicated the lives of migrants’ families. While lockdown of the Estonian and 
Russian border does not cause any debates in Finnish society, the closure of the 
Finnish-Swedish border area that had been completely open since the 1950s led to 
a debate on citizens’ constitutional rights and civil disobedience in the form of semi-
legal border crossings.
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Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic has changed the geopolitical map of the world in 
a matter of months. Travel restrictions have become a global phenomenon and 
countries around the world have closed their borders for foreign citizens, ordered 
flight and rail operators to discontinue their operations and put travellers entering 
the state into quarantine. Quarantine and health control measures are nothing new 
in the management of communicable diseases but in the context of the globalised 
world with open borders, extremely high social, economic and political interde-
pendence, the new practices of bordering shook our perception of the state and 
global integration and, in particular, transformed our everyday habits of domestic 
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and cross-border travel. Viewed as one of the most critical parts of disease control 
and national security during the pandemic they have been also criticised for limit-
ing our engagement and ability to perform in the globalised world.
The article discusses the lockdown of the EU’s internal borders during the 
COVID-19 pandemic in Finland when the Finnish government not only re-
stricted flights and ‘non-essential’ travel from non-Schengen countries such 
as Russia, China and Thailand but, with some exceptions, also limited every-
day cross-border encounters and commuting between Finland and its Schen-
gen neighbours of Sweden, Norway and Estonia. The article aims to explore 
the pandemic-bordering nexus and some of the social and economic impacts 
that bordering creates at the integrated internal border areas of the European 
Union. The paper focuses on Finland’s borders to Sweden and Estonia repre-
senting two unlike border areas with different histories and levels of cross-bor-
der integration. Due to cooperation between five Nordic countries, the border 
to Sweden had been basically non-existent since the 1950s. The introduction of 
the pandemic lockdown led to the demands to observe citizens’ constitutional 
rights for free movement and to actions of civil disobedience in the form of 
semi-legal border crossings. As many Estonian families and businesses rely 
on tourism and work across the border in Finland, the country’s decision to 
restrict border traffic had severe impacts on Estonia’s economy and families of 
Estonian commuting migrants.
The geopolitics of infectious disease control is not a new phenomenon. The 
topics of public and world health, as well as the spatial management of microbes 
and viruses, have been central in the political, legal and commercial history of 
nationalism, colonialism and internationalism. In her analysis of the history of 
disease control, Bashford [1] describes how infections disease control takes place 
not only within the jurisdiction of sovereign states but also in formal and in-
formal intervention beyond states. She connects the rise of global public health 
and disease regulation to the context of the colonisation and de-colonisation on 
one hand, and to the evolving ‘national’ and ‘international’ spheres on the other 
hand. For colonial powers ‘international health’, i. e. colonial and tropical med-
icine there in the colonies, was a question of national defence. The geopolitics 
of disease prevention was, Bashford argues [1, p. 6], closely linked nationalism 
and the policing of sovereign territory. With the increase in travel, harbours and 
land borders became places of inspection where incoming goods, vessels and 
animals, as well as peoples’ documents, identities and bodies, were examined. In 
fact, health documents and health checks including screening immigrants’ bodies 
for any signs of disease appeared before the current-day ID system, a passport or 
visa, and made borders necessary points of travel.
Communicable diseases and disease control are studied primarily within the 
disciplines of medicine and public health, but they are also important topics of 
history, public management, sociology, social policy and others. Health geog-
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raphy1 that is closely related to medical geography and the geography of health 
care, by definition, engages itself with geography and human health, while the 
topics such as mobility, border control, and isolation remain on the margins [2, 
P. 316]. In the relatively small fields of political geography and geopolitics, 
which this article contributes to, a nexus between disease, space and power is of-
ten scrutinized through globalisation and the workings of global political econ-
omy. They are also concerned with the possible impacts of disease on state sov-
ereignty and with health as a contributor to or a destructive force of geopolitical 
stability. Thus, health issues became topics in critical analysis in environmental 
security and the new security agenda in the 1990s. [4, P. 38].
Globalisation, the rapidly increased international movements of people and 
goods and the recognition of the global character of communicable diseases trans-
formed the colonial and the international health into global ‘post-Westphalian’ 
governance. A whole range of non-state actors and global health initiatives such 
as public-private partnerships, foundations, international organisations, G8, and 
civil society groups became central in setting the global health agenda, mobilis-
ing resources and providing services. [5, p. 3; 6; 7, P. 240, P. 256; 8, p. 161—164]. 
At the same time, borders became constitutive components of the new security 
discourse, technologies of governance and points of public health policy protect-
ing domestic populations from outside threats [6; 8; 9; 4]. The conception of pub-
lic health policy is still grounded in geopolitical ideas and national interests. Even 
though one nation’s health security depends on that of all the others, national (or 
sectional) interests still prevail in public health [10]. In the European Union, the 
joint public health policy and infectious disease control became conceptualised 
through ‘health security’ and the generic notion of ‘serious cross-border threats to 
health’ [11, p. 347, 361—363]. Bengtsson and Rhinard [11, p. 363] conclude that 
joint EU-level coordination and support to the resilience in member states give 
an additional value to the states’ ‘generic’ health risk management. They suggest 
that the fact that ‘serious cross-border health threats’ are increasingly considered 
as elements of societal security and subjects of crisis management reveals and 
consolidates a qualitative change in the vocabulary and priorities of health secu-
rity at EU level. More attention is paid to European level threats to health and to 
threats crossing borders than to the plain prevalence of an infectious disease in 
individual member states.
In contemporary societies, the practices of border screening for disease pre-
vention and management relate to acute outbursts of diseases caused by rapidly 
dispersing microorganisms such as bacteria and viruses or by chronic infectious 
diseases such as HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis. In the context of new ‘re-emerging 
1 According to Elliot [3], health geography “is the study of the distribution, diffusion, 
determinants, and delivery associated with health and health systems in human populations”. 
It also examines health and health systems with spatial lenses that open different perspectives 
to the study from the local (e. g., neighbourhood) to the global.
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diseases and economic globalisation’, way before the appearance of the pandemic, 
Bashford [1, p. 10—13] notices the change from ‘international’ health to ‘global’ 
health. The threats of bioterrorism, avian flu, SARS, and other microbial diseases 
are global in nature and, thus, impact the rich ‘first world’ societies as well. In 
the context of the internet, information and communications technologies, global 
social networks, transnationality and intensive cross-border mobility of people as 
well as financial capitalism are ‘placeless’ and, thus, undermine the foundations 
of national sovereignty and capacities of the state. However, the management of 
the global coronavirus pandemics in 2003 (SARS) and 2020 (COVID-19) clearly 
illustrates the dominance of nation states in disease control. Thus, global and 
European governance seem extremely weak.
In today’s context of the COVID-19 pandemic, Radil, Pinos and Ptak [12] 
write about state bordering and illustrate the sudden reintroduction of border 
enforcement as the states’ most salient political strategies to contain the virus 
and, thus, to manage the crisis. This reflects a rapid revival of nation states and 
territorial borders manifested in the expansion and the reintroduction of border 
management, including checkpoints and security forces limiting the interna-
tional, and in some cases domestic, movement of people. The new practices 
of bordering materialise themselves in extremely severe travel and mobility 
restrictions. They serve as the primary instruments of control, health risk con-
tainment and national security and, thus, securitize not only everyday mobility 
and public spaces such as shops and public transport but also seriously restrict 
travel and transnational practices. Paasi [13] reminds that even though many 
states introduce borders as the primary solution for ‘the problem’, interruption 
of global networks or value chains is seldom the best solution. As an optimist, 
he also proposes another option: the pandemic can stimulate cross-border and 
future-looking cooperation in forecasting and preparing for future pandemics 
and drug development.
Borders of Finland during pandemic
On March 11th 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared 
COVID-19 a global pandemic. A few days later, on March 16th, the plenary ses-
sion of the Government of Finland announced a three-month state of emergen-
cy first time during peace. The Emergency Powers Act and the Communicable 
Diseases Act allowed the authorities to issue and implement a whole range of 
regulations limiting people’s basic rights set in the constitution. To ‘prevent a 
serious danger to life and health’, the Government regulated visits to housing 
services for and free movement of the elderly and other at-risk groups, access to 
public establishments such as schools, universities and cultural venues such as 
libraries, mobile libraries, hobby and leisure centres, museums, and sports facil-
ities. Private and third-sector actors and religious communities were encouraged 
to do the same.
87J. Virkkunen
According to section 9 of the Constitution of Finland, Finnish citizens must not be 
prevented from entering Finland, and everyone has the right to leave Finland. How-
ever, limitations on the right to leave the country may be provided by law if they are 
necessary for the purpose of safeguarding legal proceedings or for the enforcement of 
penalties or for the fulfilment of the duty of national defence2.
This quotation from the Finnish Border Guard instructions for passengers 
(2020a) points to several key principles and practices of bordering that the Emer-
gency Powers Act introduced during 2020 pandemic, its ability to restrict people’s 
constitutional right for free movement within Finland and across borders. Based 
on the Government order, the Border Guard Act, and the EU’s Schengen Borders 
Code, on March 19th 2020, the government introduced new entry requirements 
and border traffic restrictions. The passenger traffic was restricted at the ‘eastern’ 
border and at the ‘internal’ borders of Finland3. The government recommended 
the shipping companies operating from Sweden, Estonia and Germany to dis-
continue ticket sales for passenger traffic until mid-May, with the exception of 
cargo traffic and the return of Finnish citizens and persons residing in Finland. 
Finnish citizens and residents were advised to return to Finland immediately and 
not to travel ‘abroad’. ‘Essential travels’ for work and to access ‘necessary ser-
vices’ were permitted across the northern and western borders. People returning 
to Finland from abroad by land, sea and air were advised to remain in conditions 
equivalent to quarantine for 14 days.
Finland shares its borders with four states: Estonia, Sweden, Norway and the 
Russian Federation. As the Finnish history and the changes in the region’s geo-
political settings well indicate, relations to each of the bordering states, as well as 
different segments of the border, are different. The term ‘internal’ refers to Fin-
land’s Schengen borders to Sweden, Norway and Estonia, with traditions of free 
movement of people, while the ‘eastern’ and ‘external’ refer to the well-guarded 
border to Russia where also a valid passport and, usually, a visa is needed. The 
‘essential travel’ and ‘necessary services’ refer to some of the exemptions in bor-
dering under the Emergency Powers Act. These politically complex exceptions, 
and their implementation by the Finnish Border Guard, enabled some passenger 
traffic across Finland’s borders. However, the vague definition of ‘essential’ and 
the understanding of constitutional rights lead to a discussion of de facto legality 
of the government’s border policy on the one hand and to civil disobedience and 
semi-legal border crossings on the other hand. The impact and experiences of the 
situation clearly depended on the context.
2 The instructions of the Finnish Border Guard to passengers regarding entry to Finland, 2020, 
Finnish Border Guard. URL: https://www.raja.fi/current_issues/guidelines_for_border_traffic 
(accessed 8 December 2020).
3 Finnish border traffic to be restricted as of 19 March 2020, 2020, Finnish Border Guard. 
URL: https://www.raja.fi/current_issues/facts/news_from_the_border_guard/1/0/finnish_
border_traffic_to_be_restricted_as_of_19_march_2020_79144 (accessed 8 December 
2020); Traveller, Return to Finland, 2020, Ministry for Foreign Affairs. URL: https://um.fi/
ajankohtaista/-/asset_publisher/gc654PySnjTX/content/ulkoministeri-c3-b6-c3-a4l-c3-a4-
matkusta-ulkomaille- (accessed 8 December 2020) (in Finnish).
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Table 1
COVID-19 cases, COVID-19 related deaths and the number 
of new cases per 100,000 for the last 14 days of the month 
in Finland, Sweden and Estonia in 2020* (ECDC 2020)
Month
Cases Deaths New cases / 100.000, avg.
Finland Sweden Estonia Finland Sweden Estonia Finland Sweden Estonia
January 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
February 3 11 1 0 0 0 0,01 0,01 0,005
March 1315 4360 716 13 289 3 6,3 10,15 14,45
April 4908 20968 1667 206 2803 50 28,76 63,83 40,48
May 6828 38390 1866 316 4593 63 19,64 77,63 8,38
June 7211 67060 1988 328 5482 0 4,94 118,49 5,74
July 7425 76681 2052 329 5760 0 1,75 67,33 1,64
August 8079 84234 2374 335 5839 64 4,49 34,42 8,45
September 9894 93160 3316 343 5895 0 11,38 33,52 26,03
October** 11051 96685 3716 346 5904 67 31,91 61,41 51,48
* Cumulative, at the end of the month. ** Average The situation on 8 October.
Sources: ECDC 2020, Daily update of new reported cases of COVID-19 by country 
worldwide, European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. URL: https://www.
ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/download-todays-data-geographic-distribution-cov-
id-19-cases-worldwide (accessed 8 December 2020).
The dynamics of COVID-19 cases and deaths in Finland, Sweden and Esto-
nia were different (see table 1). With its more liberal policy, the overall number 
of cases, COVID-19 related deaths and the number of new cases per 100,000 in 
Sweden were clearly higher than those in the other two countries. This difference 
in the epidemiological situation had a direct impact on the way Finnish and Es-
tonian policymakers, as well as health border authorities, viewed the free move-
ment with Sweden, it was perceived as a risk. While Estonia created the ‘Baltic 
bubble’ allowing free movement between it, Latvia and Lithuania, Finland tight-
ened the ‘non-essential’ mobility with all its neighbours in the North (Sweden, 
Norway), in the South (Estonia) and in the East (Russia).
Finland’s ‘eastern’ border to Russia is an external border of the European 
Union and, thus, follows the joint Schengen regulations for border control. It also 
complies with the EU-level guidelines, best practices and recommendations for 
border guards as well as with the joint standards of information exchange. When 
the border traffic restrictions entered into force on March 19th, the passenger 
traffic was severely restricted and, apart from cargo, only some dual citizens, 
students coming to Finland and family members of Finnish citizens were able to 
cross the border. Consequently, the number of daily border crossings in Southeast 
Finland Border Guard District dropped from about 8,000—15,000 passengers to 
89J. Virkkunen
1,000—1,500 with about 80% of them being professional freight drivers [14]. 
The new regulations allowed goods to move across borders but prohibited pas-
senger travel such as tourism, they banned Russian cottage owners from visiting 
their properties in Finland and Finnish borderlanders from visiting Russia for 
‘cheap’ gasoline. Cross-border cooperation projects transferred to online plat-
forms but empty shops, malls and outlet villages had a serious impact on eco-
nomic development in areas such as South-East Finland that relied heavily on 
cross-border business and tourism.
Unlike the ‘eastern’ border to Russia, Finland’s western and northern borders 
to Sweden and Norway have been open for local border traffic for a long time. 
No passports have been required from the citizens of the five Nordic countries 
(Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Iceland) since the 1950s. Since Fin-
land’s entered the Schengen area in 2001, the border can be crossed anywhere 
[15] and the borders neither to Sweden nor Norway had any significance. There-
fore, the government’s March 19th decision to restore border checks4 and to ban 
all movement other than cargo traffic and ‘essential’ travel-to-work commuting 
was controversial. Due to the high number of COVID-19 cases in Sweden, it was 
both welcomed and confusing. In the areas with hundreds of years’ joint history, 
shared business and social infrastructure, e. g. in the joint city centre of Haparan-
da-Tornio twin city, the restrictions created some distress and ‘semi-legal’ traffic 
across the border to/from Sweden. In the South, the maritime border to Estonia 
had lost its significance upon Estonia’s joining the EU in 2004 and entering the 
Schengen territory in 2007.
Like the land border to Sweden, the border at the Gulf of Finland developed 
into an area with the strong and active cross-border agglomeration of business, 
tourism and labour. During the pandemic, Finland’s border control transformed 
both the travels and encounters between the two countries and the lives of Esto-
nian immigrants in Finland.
In the following part, I will discuss the above territorial lockdown during 
COVID-19 pandemic in Finland. Special attention will be paid to the govern-
ments’ aim to “protect the population and secure functions of society” by restrict-
ing migration and mobility at Finland’s internal borders to Sweden and Estonia. 
The paper is based on academic and media reports, seminar discussions and in-
4 According to the Schengen Border Code (Temporary Reintroduction of Border Control, 
Migration and Home Affairs, 2020, European Commission. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen/reintroduction-border-control_en 
(accessed 8 December 2020)), member states can reintroduce border checks at internal borders 
temporarily in the event that is a serious threat to public policy or internal security. The control 
must remain an exception, must respect the principle of proportionality and be limited in time. 
Previous time any control took place at Finland’s border to Sweden was during the 2015—
2016 ‘migration crisis’ when the Finnish Border Guard in cooperation with the Swedish Police 
exercised ‘intensified immigration control’ (‘tehostettu ulkomaalaisvalvonta’ in Finnish). (see 
e. g. [17;18]). Formally, that was not border control but, rather, surveillance of foreign citizens 
including identity checks both in areas close to the border and Finland as a whole.
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formation received from publications (news, statistics, etc.) of and meetings with 
the Finnish Border Guard. These will be analysed by using qualitative content 
analysis approach.
Medical personnel, snus and civil disobedience  
at the Swedish border
The history of the Finnish-Swedish border goes back to the Treaty of Fredrik-
shamn in 1809 when Sweden ceded Finland over to the Russian Empire. The 
border is the Sea of Åland and the Gulf of Bothnia in the South and the rivers Tor-
nionjoki and Muonionjoki in the North. As members of the Nordic cooperation 
both Finland and Sweden have been committed to free movement of passengers 
and labour since the 1950s. The passport control was abolished already in 1952. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, the free movement culminated to mass migration to the 
rapidly developing industrial cities of Sweden. According to Korkisaari [16] up 
to 545,000 Finnish citizens moved to Sweden and about 295,000 moved back to 
Finland during 1945—2000. That was about 70% of all Finnish emigrants during 
the period and, including descendants, an increase of about half a million inhab-
itants in Sweden. These, combined with the traditionally intensive cross-border 
encounters in Torne River Valley, once a single cultural entity without border, and 
the Schengen cooperation in 2001 created a joint space for cultural heritage and 
intensive social, economic and political encounters.
Within the above context of cross-border integration, the government’s deci-
sion to restrict border traffic at the Finland-Sweden border on March 19th was 
exceptional. The border was open only at Karesuvanto, Kolari, Muonio, Pello, 
Tornio and Ylitornio border-crossing points for goods and return traffic as well 
as for ‘essential’ commuting and other traffic. Crossing the border elsewhere was 
not permitted. Everyone, including Nordic citizens, was also obligated to carry 
a passport or an official ID. In practice, the new restrictions paralyzed many of 
the daily activities in the area where people used to work, visit friends or family 
members, go for shopping, movies or undertake other leisure activities and, im-
portantly, do business across the border on a daily basis. The countries’ different 
epidemiological development and approaches to virus control set the basis both 
for the state and civic discourses of the COVID-19 and cooperation.
According to the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control5, the 
first cases in Sweden occurred in late February. Their number increased to 20,000 
cases at the end of April and 93,000 at the end of September. With the first cases 
registered in Finland about a week later, their number in Finland rose to 5,000 at 
5 Daily update of new reported cases of COVID-19 by country worldwide, 2020, European 
Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. URL: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/
publications-data/download-todays-data-geographic-distribution-covid-19-cases-worldwide 
(accessed 8 December 2020).
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the end of April and to 9,900 at the end of September. Similarly to the number 
of new reported COVID-19 cases, the number of COVID-19 related deaths in 
Sweden (5,895 on September 31st) was about ten times higher than in Finland 
(343 on September 31st). The numbers reflecting the different medical approach 
to the pandemic — Sweden’s being more liberal– as well as the fear for Finland’s 
medical capacity set the basis for Finland’s approach to and the discourses on the 
Swedish border during the pandemic. As the Minister of the Interior Maria Ohisa-
lo stated at the government’s COVID-19 briefing: “The intensive care capacity of 
the North is rather small, and we cannot risk that. So now during the next weeks 
we need to limit even commuter traffic6.”
Following the countries’ commitment for free movement, the border between 
Finland and Sweden opened on September 19th, six months after the unprece-
dented introduction of border control. Thus, the reasoning behind and the social, 
economic and political consequences of virus control in the two countries rise a 
number of interesting questions regarding the politics of bordering. First, the new 
border regulations restricted ‘non-essential’ crossings to/from Sweden. The ferry 
connection between Helsinki and Stockholm halted but, as its part of Finland’s 
critical infrastructure, the connection between Turku and Stockholm continued 
its operations for cargo and returning passengers but not for cruises and other 
personal traffic. In the North where the border area makes a joint travel-to-work 
area, the narrow interpretation of the ‘non-essential’ travel, as well as the restric-
tions’ impact on daily commuting, caused some concern. However, the Deputy 
Commander of the Lapland Border Guard District Janne Kurvinen explained the 
necessity of the restrictions during the pandemic:
The border checks have been reintroduced for a reason. They have been intro-
duced not to annoy but to protect people. Many things at the border areas are different, 
at least momentarily, when regular business across the border has been restricted. You 
cannot go across the border for regular shopping, banking or second home visits if it 
is not essential for the lives of people [19].
The final decision on the ‘essential’ character of a border crossing was made 
by the Border Guard checking the purpose of travel. Commander Kurvinen’s 
above statement clearly demonstrates that the Border Guards in charge occasion-
ally disagree with the citizens’ conception of trips’ essentiality, and this may lead 
to further clarification or, even, to a fine. As the epidemiological situation in Swe-
den was considerably worse than in Finland, the new restrictions and the efforts 
of the Border Guard to limit the spread of the virus were strongly supported both 
in the region and in the country in general. The recommendation for self-quar-
6 Hallitus aloittaa pikaisesti valmistelut pohjois- ja länsirajaliikenteen tiukentamiseksi — 
Joudumme jopa työmatkaliikennettä rajoittamaan, sisäministeri sanoo, 2020, I. URL: https://
yle.fi/uutiset/3—11283443 (accessed 8 December 2020) (in Finnish).
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antine remained valid until the reopening of the border on September 19th, six 
months after the introduction of the control. After a week, on September 24th, the 
government reintroduced the border control due to the rapidly deteriorating epi-
demiological situation in Sweden, this time with an exemption for the residents of 
‘border communities’7. The acknowledgement of special needs among the com-
munities at the border was a great success for the Lapland Chamber of Commerce 
that, among others, demanded a regionally sensitive approach to health policy 
that previously ignored all regional specificities and differences8.
The second fascinating aspect of disease control relates to the above-men-
tioned constitutional rights of the Finnish citizens to exit and enter the territo-
ry of Finland at any times. At the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemics in 
March, the government sent a clear message to its citizens: “The borders are 
closed, this is not the time to travel for summer cottages, only ‘essential’ trips 
abroad are allowed, and both the Police and the Border Guard guarantee that 
the law is being complied”. However, in early May, a couple of months after 
the new measures were implemented, local media along with people who used 
to cross the Swedish border on daily basis suddenly realised that the ban was 
not legal and it violated citizens’ constitutional rights to exit and enter Finland. 
Having consulted lawyers, they concluded that the Border Guard had exceeded 
its authority by restricting the cross-border traffic with Sweden. As restrictions 
to the border traffic were not used for medical reasons only, and people at-
tempting to cross the border were requested information and certificates of the 
‘essentiality’ of their travel, the measures were assessed as disproportional and, 
even, as an excess of power by the Border Guard [20]. Interestingly, the Border 
Guard recognizes the questionable character of the restrictions but justifies the 
actions by their ‘essentiality’ for safeguarding citizens’ fundamental rights to 
life and health protection. In its public response to the critique and complaints 
submitted to the Chancellor of Justice and the Parliamentary Ombudsman, the 
Finnish Border Guard clarifies:
The decision to restore the internal border control has not violated the constitu-
tionally guaranteed freedom of movement, according to which a Finnish citizen must 
never be prevented from entering the country. Moreover, everyone has the right to 
leave the country unless this right is legally restricted. Consequently, the decisions 
taken by the Government regarding travel restriction are partly of a recommendatory 
7 To ease the situation in the North, the government introduced a border community regime 
with no requirements for quarantine. At the Swedish border, the regime applies to the 
municipalities of Haparanda, Övertorneå, Pajala and Kiruna in Sweden, and Tornio, Ylitornio, 
Pello, Kolari, Muonio and Enontekiö in Finland. At the Norwegian border, the regime applies 
to the municipalities of Storfjord, Kåfjord, Nordreisa, Kautokeino, Kaarasjok, Tana, Nesseby, 
and Sør-Varanger in Norway, and Enontekiö, Inari, and Utsjoki in Finland.
8 Lapland Chamber of Commerce 2020, 2020, Border Crossing Statement of Lapland 
Chamber of Commerce. URL: https://www.lapland.chamber.fi/lapin-kauppakamarin-
rajanylityskannanotto-23—9/ (accessed 8 December 2020) (in Finnish).
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nature and their purpose was to slow down the spread of the pandemic. In these re-
spects, the border officers have with instructions and advice supported the realization 
of the Government’s goals9.
The Border Guard’s decision to restrict border crossings was a good exam-
ple of two significantly important constitutional rights competing, to an extent, 
during the state of emergency: Right to life and health vs. the right to freedom 
of movement. The Border Guard is and represents itself as a body implementing 
the government’s decisions. At the Swedish land border, the opening, however, 
led to an immediate increase in the number of border crossings particularly at 
Ylitornio and Haparanda-Tornio twin city10. Besides travel-to-work commuting 
and other daily affairs, many of the newspapers drew attention to snus11 issue and 
civic disobedience at the border. The below example of snus shopping in Sweden 
reveals how some people, despite strong recommendations not to travel, took the 
initiative to cross the border as personal reserves of snus were getting low and its 
price on the Finnish black market was increasing. A man from Kemi, about 30km 
from the border, told about his trips across the border. Having become aware 
of his constitutional right to visit Sweden through the grapevine, despite border 
checks and quarantine, he decided to go for shopping.
I have done it, the thing that you should not do. So, you must accept the two-week 
quarantine but the following week I did it again. I am a bit of a rebel… Sometimes the 
inspectors grumble what my personal motives are [to cross the border], I tell them that 
I do not have to tell them [21].
Majority of border crossings in the territory of Lapland Border Guard District 
was still travel-to-work and other ‘essential’ border crossings such as family vis-
its12. As a concession, the Minister of the Interior Ms Maria Ohisalo recognized 
Finnish citizens’ constitutional rights to travel abroad and supported the new gov-
ernmental decision to award ‘border communities’ of Finland, Sweden and Nor-
9 The Basics of the Border Guard in Internal Border Control, 2020, Finnish Border Guard. 
URL: https://www.raja.fi/ajankohtaista/tietoa/tiedotteet/1/0/rajavartiolaitoksen_toimin nan_ 
perusteista_sisarajavalvonnassa_79675 (accessed 8 December 2020) (in Finnish).
10 Haparanda-Tornio twin city is an urban agglomeration of about 32,000 inhabitants that 
consists of the city of Hapranda in Sweden and the city of Tornio in Finland. According 
to Mainio (2020), 13.5 million crossed the border at Tornio in 2019. In Haparanda and the 
surrounding Swedish side of the valley, most of the medical doctors and care personnel, 
teachers, elderly care workers etc. are Finnish. The cities have over 40 cooperation agreements, 
including a joint school, travel centre, water treatment and heating plants, provincial museum 
and, of course, Ikea.
11 Snus is moist smokeless tobacco that originates in Sweden. It is commonly used also in 
Finland, but it cannot be purchased in any EU country except for Sweden.
12 Liikenne kasvaa Lapin sisärajoilla — Ylitornio ja Kilpisjärvi ovat vilkkaimmat Lapin 
rajavartioston valvomat rajanylityspaikat länsi- ja pohjoisrajoilla, 2020, RAYA 100. 
URL: https://www.raja.fi/lr/tiedotteet/1/0/liikenne_kasvaa_lapin_sisarajoilla_-_ylitornio_ja_
kilpisjarvi_ovat_vilkkaimmat_lapin_rajavartioston_valvomat_rajanylityspaikat_lansi-_ja_
pohjoisrajoilla_79783 (accessed 8 December 2020).
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way a special status13. The new arrangement that came into effect on September 
29th allowed the residents of border municipalities to cross the border even if 
the border crossings were otherwise restricted due to worsening epidemiological 
situation in Sweden. Thus, Ohisalo did appeal to Finns’ morale and responsibility 
to refrain from any travels across [21]:
Finnish citizens are always allowed to exit the country and come back. I appeal to 
the morale of Finnish citizens and to the fact that Border Guards work risking their 
health. Nurses, medical doctors fighting this disease risk their health every day.
Tourism and the family decisions at the Estonian border
The second case study of this paper, Finland’s border to Estonia during 
COVID-19 pandemic, is very different from the one with Sweden. The cultural 
relations and mobility between Finland and Estonia have changed since the mid-
19th century [24]. The foundation for relations and cross-border encounters was 
laid by cultural enthusiasts in the late 19th century Russian Empire and early 
20th century independent Estonia. Yet, much of the contemporary relations en-
counters between the two countries developed during and, particularly, after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. Opening of the regular boat connection in 1965 
between Helsinki and Soviet Tallinn, unfolded new possibilities for travel. While 
Estonians were able to get acquainted with Finland through the Finnish TV and 
radio, only a few Estonians could travel to Finland due to tight exit regulations 
of the Soviet state. The number of Finnish tourists in Estonia, however, grew. 
The border opening upon the restoration of Estonia’s independence in 1991, as 
well as Estonia’s accession to the EU in 2004 and its joining Schengen Area in 
December 2007, transformed the cross-border travel and migration across the 
Gulf of Finland. As components of Finnish critical infrastructure, a basic ferry 
connection between the two countries continued during the pandemic, although 
only for cargo. The restrictions hit first and foremost tourism, Estonian migrant 
workers in Finland and their families in Estonia.
The area that is playfully also referred to as Talsinki or Hellinn14, has during 
the years become a transnational space where the movement of people, goods 
and services is constant and an everyday practice both among Finns and for Es-
13 The instructions of the Finnish Border Guard to passengers regarding entry to Finland, 2020, 
RAYA 100. URL: https://www.raja.fi/current_issues/guidelines_for_border_traffic (accessed 8 
December 2020).
14 The notion of Talsinki or Hellinn comes from an idea of a twin city consisting of Finland’s 
capital Helsinki and Estonia’s capital Tallinn. It is closely related to cities’ strategic cooperation 
and an idea of twin city with concrete development goals through mobility of people and 
goods, services for non-residents, competitiveness and marketing of the region and well-being 
of the Baltic Sea. The notion has been extended to concrete projects aiming to develop co-
operation and infrastructure (e. g. tunnel) of the region.
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tonians. According to the Bank of Estonia15, over 6.1 million non-resident trips 
were made to Estonia in 2019, out of which one third, about two million, was 
made by Finns. It is estimated that tourism and its EUR 2 billion receipts made up 
about 8% of Estonia’s GDP in 201816, thus, the share of Finnish tourists is central 
for the country’s economy. During the pandemic, the total number of overnights 
in Estonia decreased by 45% from about 4.9 million in 2019 (January-August) 
to 2.67 million in 2020. Estonians’ domestic travel during the summer holidays 
compensated some of the 62 per cent decrease in foreign tourists. During the 
first eight months of 2020, Finnish tourists made about 21% of all overnights in 
Estonia (34% in Tallinn), including overnights by domestic tourists, but Finnish 
citizens accounted for the largest share (41%) of foreigners’ overnights in the 
country17.
The number of Finnish tourists started to decrease in mid-March and early 
April (see table 2), in the aftermath of the ‘travel ban recommendation’ and the 
restricted sales of tickets for passenger traffic issued by the Finnish government. 
Upon some improvement of the epidemiological situation in Estonia, Tallinn and 
Pärnu remained the most popular destinations among Finns. For many of them, 
Estonia is familiar, easy-access and safe and, therefore, it can serve as a substi-
tute for the ‘usual’ summer vacation destinations of Greece and Spain during the 
pandemic.
Table 2
Overnights by Finns in Estonia, January-August 2020
Month January February March April May June July August
Estonia, total 71 950 101 165 30 978 262 1 873 37 248 156 166 78 126
Tallinn 51 456 74 609 20 652 125 1 407 22 243 89 958 46 442
Pärnu 11 908 15 724 6 363 37 147 8 848 38 822 16 476
Tartu 2 696 3 018 956 63 148 1 640 8 103 3 888
Other 5 890 7 814 3 007 37 171 4 517 19 283 11 320
Sources: Turismi arengu ülevaated, 2020, Puhka Eestis. URL: https://www.puh-
kaeestis.ee/et/uuringud-ja-ulevaated/turismi-arengu-ulevaated (accessed 8 December 
2020).
Alho and Kumer-Haukanõmm [25, p. 17] portray the extent and the recipro-
cal character of mobility and migration between Finland and Estonia. Accord-
ing to them, these “challenge the classification of identity binarily and roughly 
15 Inbound travel, 2020, Eesti Pank 2020. URL: https://statistika.eestipank.ee/#/en/p/1410/ 
r/2831/2620 (accessed 8 December 2020).
16 Tourism Trends and Policies, 2020, OECD. doi: https://doi.org/10.1787/6b47b985-en.
17 Turismi arengu ülevaated, 2020, Puhka Eestis. URL: https://www.puhkaeestis.ee/et/
uuringud-ja-ulevaated/turismi-arengu-ulevaated (accessed 8 December 2020).
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as ’Finnish’ or ‘Estonian’ and give new meanings to the concepts of ‘home’, 
‘foreign’, ‘presence’ and ‘absence’”. Besides tourism, long-term migration and 
transnational life have become a fact of life in the region. The number of Estonian 
immigrants in Finland has increased from 710 in 1990 to about 29,000 in 2010 
and, notably, to about 51,000 in 201918. Actually, Alho and Kumer-Haukanõmm 
[25, p. 18] argue that ‘Estonians’ is a heterogeneous group that consists not only 
of Estonians but also of Ingrian Finns and Russian speakers of several national-
ities. Besides tourists and labour migrants, there are also students and entrepre-
neurs as well as spouses, children and retired individuals many of whom have 
immigrated along with the family. As many of the Estonians do not register their 
stay in Finland but commute between their ‘home’ in Estonia and Finland, the 
figures can be much higher. Between 1992 and 2019, over 8,500 Estonians have 
also received Finnish citizenship19.
In 2011, up to 80—90% of the Estonians in Finland were men. Many of them 
travelled between home and work (in Finland) weekly, monthly, or slightly less 
often. The distance between the capitals of Finland and Estonia is only 80 kilo-
metres and the inexpensive ferry connection across the Gulf of Finland takes only 
two hours. Employment in Finland where salaries are considerably higher than 
in Estonia gives commuters a sense of financial security and general well-being. 
Strong family and friendships relations in Estonia mean that most of the migrants 
have no desire to change their country of residence. [26, p. 141; 27, p. 158, 164—
166]. That transnational life of commuting migrants materialises itself in constant 
travel, distance relationship and experience of being separated from one’s wife 
and children. These often result in the feeling of loneliness, alienation between 
the father and his children, parallel relationships, or divorce. Yet, frequent com-
munication combined with the economic security, well-valued quality time with 
the family during days off, including domestic and international travel, and better 
prospects of being able to support children’s education may have a positive im-
pact on the relationship [27; 28]. Even though children may get material benefits 
from family members’ work abroad, they may have difficulties comprehending 
the ‘necessity’ of the situation [29, p. 94].
In this context, an article on Estonian construction workers being ‘corona pris-
oners’ in Finland [30] clearly illustrates the trouble that the sudden restrictions 
of border traffic created for Estonian labour migrants and their families. As Esto-
nians’ commuting across the Gulf of Finland was usually not considered as ‘es-
sential’, the government’s decision to terminate ticket sales for passenger traffic 
put Estonian migrants’ lives on hold. They had to choose between going ‘home’ 
to Estonia or continuing earning in Finland, without knowing if they would be 
18 Immigrants and integration, 2020, Statistics Finland Web databases, available at http://




able to go home before the end of the pandemic. In the article published in ear-
ly-May [Ibid.], an Estonian construction worker voices his perspective that, I 
argue, represents a broader sentiment among commuting Estonians in Finland.
I have not seen my family since then… Of course, I miss my close ones. Here, no 
one has been at home. Men walk around with depressed faces. But we have no choice 
since if you go to Estonia, you cannot come back. Everyone stays here, scared to lose 
the job!
The man had briefly visited Estonia for his son’s birthday one and a half 
months before writing that, shortly, as the borders to Finland would be closed and 
travel-to-work commuting was not possible. Living apart from families, often in 
collective flats with several other male migrants, was challenging. While some 
decided to return home and find alternative employment in Estonia, others decid-
ed to stay in Finland due to Finland’s more regulated and secure labour market. In 
Mõttus-Lepik’s report [30], two men tell about the use of new telecommunication 
technologies for migrants’ practices of home making in a transnational or translo-
cal contexts. That is an important tool not only for Estonian migrants in Finland 
but for migrants around the world (see e. g. [27; 31]).
I talk to them every evening through a video call. It is a kind of adventure, isn’t it? 
They wait for me, and I wait for them. I am here for my family’s sake to earn some 
money.
Every morning, lunchtime and evening we communicate through video call but 
the absence of the physical contact is immense… And it has not been so easy for my 
wife either in Spain [where she stays] where the restrictions were particularly harsh. 
She could go out of the flat only to take out the trash and to go to a store.
Overall, these relate to the notion of transnational relationships and care 
among migrant families that suddenly revolutionised after the government de-
cided to restrict mobility between the two countries. Working with Bryceson’s 
and Vuorela’s [32] and Pöllänen’s [33] conceptions, Siim [26, p. 142] explains 
how transnational families have specific — often conscious — ways of express-
ing love, affection and care when everyday presence and family routines are 
absent. In the above example, video calls are significant daily practices that re-
duce emotional stress among migrants. However, both the physical longing and 
the worry about family members ‘at home’ remain. While some of the migrants 
had no other options but to ‘wait and hope’ for the changes in border traffic 
regulations in Finland, others left Finland for good or tried to find ‘alternative’ 
ways to cross the border back and forth. A migrant in Mõttus-Lepik’s [30] report 
explains:
You get a commercial vehicle and drive. As freight traffic is allowed, with a small 
van you will get across [the border]. If you tell them that you are bringing goods and 
you are a transport worker, the Finnish customs will let you through smoothly… In 
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theory, you could even visit your family in Estonia this way, but people have not done 
that yet. Now we just wait and hope that the Finnish government will ease the border 
restrictions on Sunday.
Since it was an important issue for Estonian labour and Finnish companies 
alike, and the idea was strongly promoted by the Estonian government, the com-
muting migrants were exempted from the 14-day quarantine when the Finnish 
government on September 12th tightened its travel restrictions with Estonia. 
While the Finnish government introduced the concept of ‘border communities’ 
at the Swedish border, Estonian travel-to-work migrants also got a special status 
for border crossings.
Conclusion
The history of borders as the primary solution for disease control is not a new 
phenomenon. In the context of the globalised economy, transnational networks 
and lives, as well as global value chains, states’ decision to restrict travel and 
transnational practices is not, necessarily, the best solution. Being central compo-
nents of nation states and popular in nationalist and populist discourses while, at 
the same time, functioning as instruments of control and health risk containment, 
borders and cross-border mobility are clearly securitized during the pandemic. 
Allowing cargo and ‘essential’ travel at the ‘internal’ borders, the Finnish gov-
ernment acknowledged the importance of well-functioning border-crossings for 
Finland’s economy, performance and security. As the recent special arrangements 
of ‘border communities’ and commuting clearly indicate, the government, after 
all, responded to the critique and diplomatic pressure for alleviating social costs 
of its bordering.
The Finnish government protects its population and secures functions of so-
ciety during the pandemic by restricting mobility and migration from its neigh-
bouring states and beyond. The ‘external’ border of Finland to Russia was closed 
and effected particularly cross-border shopping and local economies in border 
communities. The ‘internal’ borders to Sweden and Estonia, that this paper con-
centrates on, represent two different historical, social and economic bordering 
contexts within the European Union. In the North, the cultures and the practices 
of border-crossing have been developing for centuries. Up to ten times higher 
infection rates in Sweden ‘forced’ Finland to restrict border traffic for over half a 
year and separated an integrated border area where people used to cross the bor-
der daily for work, leisure, shopping and family affairs. A special ‘border com-
munity’ concept and free cross-border movement for locals were introduced only 
in autumn 2020 when the government reinstated border control due to the deteri-
orating epidemiological situation in Sweden. In the South, the encounters across 
the Gulf of Finland between Finland and Estonia became extremely intensive 
only during the last decades. Besides interrupting the exceptionally lively tourism 
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exchange, the new lockdown disrupted personal encounters and networks among 
commuters, migrant families and others. It also hampered the transnational fam-
ily making and the development of personal networks, as well as caused severe 
economic losses for businesses and regions alike. Besides preventing the spread 
of the virus during the pandemic, the lockdown shook the areas that had been 
economically and socially integrating for years.
The COVID-19 pandemic has transformed our understanding of globalising 
and Europeanising world. The illusion of a global world and borderless Europe 
has turned into a hey-day of nation states where international cooperation is 
scarce and different types of bordering practices are more rigorous than ever. 
Besides states’ territorial borders, the practices of bordering have extended to 
public spaces and spaces outside border areas. In a way, bodies — particularly 
foreign bodies aiming to cross the border — have become spaces of suspicion 
and sites of bordering. In the context of very strong political pressure and meth-
odological nationalism, the new practices often remain unnoticed. We can, thus, 
ask: Do bordering and restrictions to migration and mobility provide a solution 
to the ‘problem’? And at what cost do they come for citizens, local communities 
and businesses?
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